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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PAM STILLINGS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
1-800-CONTACTS, INC.
Defendant.
) Case No: 3:16-cv-5400
)
) PLAINTIFF’S CLASS-ACTION
) COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL
) RESTRAINTS OF TRADE IN
) VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1
)
) PRAYER FOR RELIEF
)
) DEMAND OF JURY TRIAL
)
) PROPOSED CLASS-ACTION
) UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 23
)
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 I. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE (FED. R. CIV. P. 8)
Plaintiff is a proposed representative of a putative class of purchasers who
within the past four years purchased contact lenses online from Defendant, 1-800-
Contacts, Inc. (“800-Contacts”). 800-Contacts overcharged Plaintiff and each
member of the proposed class of purchasers by charging supracompetitive prices for
the contact lenses that it sold to them. 800-Contacts was able to charge these prices
only by restraining and suppressing competition for the online sale of contact lenses
in the United States; otherwise, it would have been constrained to charge competitive
prices for its above sales of contact lenses to Plaintiff and all other members of the
putative class. 
The specific trade restraints in question are a series of bilateral agreements that
800-Contacts made with fourteen of its direct competitors, which on information and
belief 800-Contacts continues to enforce. These agreements, as enforced, have
unlawfully restrained trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which is
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Section 1”). More specifically, these agreements have
restrained trade as follows: (1) they have established an unlawful, ongoing bid-
rigging conspiracy among direct competitors to rig their bids for search-engine
advertising; (2) they have established an unlawful, ongoing conspiracy among direct
competitors to allocate online sales according to pre-defined internet search queries;
and (3) they have established an unlawful, ongoing conspiracy among direct
competitors to suppress their advertising and the dissemination of information about
their products and offers.
To challenge these matters, Plaintiff now asserts a single cause of action
against 800-Contacts for employing unlawful restraints of trade in violation of
Section 1, and she brings this claim on behalf of herself and all other members of her
proposed class of purchasers.
As demonstrated by the Federal Trade Commission in its recently filed
administrative complaint, 800-Contacts used improper coercion to oblige fourteen of
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its direct competitors to accept identical or similarly worded bilateral agreements with
it. The principal provisions of these agreements constitute per se violations of Section
1 and favor 800-Contacts at the expense of its rivals. 800-Contacts was the instigator
and has been the primary beneficiary of these anticompetitive agreements.
800-Contacts prevailed on its rivals to assent to its agreements by threatening
to bring objectively baseless claims against them for trademark infringement unless
they did so. With one exception, each of 800-Contacts’ rivals ceded in response to
this threat. The one rival that refused to yield was obliged to defend itself against an
objectively baseless litigation that 800-Contacts litigated with zeal in order to send a
message to its other rivals and to punish the hold-out rival with costly, prolonged
litigation. Foreseeably, 800-Contacts lost on the merits in this litigation at summary
judgment and then again on appeal, but the litigation served its intended purpose of
intimidating its rivals, disrupting their operations, and pressuring fourteen of them to
assent or maintain their assent to its anticompetitive bilateral agreements. 
800-Contacts’ agreements with its direct competitors established a coordinated
bid-rigging conspiracy, an elaborate market-allocation scheme, and a related scheme
to suppress advertising and the dissemination of information about the online sale of
contact lenses. These agreements constitute trade restraints made between direct
competitors that are unlawful under Section 1 under all three applicable standards of
review: (1) the per se standard, which governs bid-rigging and the allocation of
markets by horizontal agreement; (2) the quick-look standard, which governs
apparently anticompetitive schemes with which the courts lack familiarity; and (3) the
rule-of-reason standard (the “Rule of Reason”), which governs all other challenged
restraints of trade. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should apply well-recognized per
se rules in order to condemn the challenged trade restraints, but in an abundance of
caution she has pled her claim in the alternative so that it is raised not only under the
per se rules, but also under the quick-look standard and the Rule of Reason.
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Plaintiff is an individual who during the past four years overpaid for contact
lenses that she purchased from 800-Contacts because of its imposition of unlawful
restraints of trade. She was also deprived of a meaningful choice between alternative
products and services because of 800-Contact’s restraints of trade. She proposes to
serve as the named representative of a class of persons who purchased contact lenses
from 800-Contacts during the last four years, and who overpaid for these purchases
and were deprived of alternative offerings because of 800-Contacts’ imposition of
unlawful restraints of trade. If 800-Contacts had not employed the trade restraints that
Plaintiff now challenges, it would not have been able to overcharge Plaintiff or the
other class members and would not have done so. Plaintiff now seeks certification of
the proposed class and all relief that the law affords to this class. 
II. THE PARTIES
1. Plaintiff, Pam Stillings, is an individual who maintains her domicile in
Contra Costa County, California. 
2. Defendant, 1-800-Contacts, Inc. (“800-Contacts”), is a corporation
formed under the laws of the United States that maintains its headquarters in Draper,
Utah.
III.  JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s sole cause of action arises
under Section 1 – i.e., Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1. On the basis of this claim, Plaintiff seeks damages under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15, as well as injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. §
26. This Court has original and exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
claim under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, and therefore it also has subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (vesting all federal district
courts with original jurisdiction over any claim that arises under a statute of the
United States).
//
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4. Personal Jurisdiction. This Court has personal jurisdiction over 800-
Contacts under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22 because 800-Contacts conducts business in
the Northern District of California and otherwise can be “found” in this judicial
district. 
5. Venue. This Court is the proper venue for the present action because (1)
800-Contacts conducts substantial commerce in this judicial district; (2) 800-Contacts
has engaged in the challenged conduct and employed the challenged trade restraints
in this judicial district; (3) Plaintiff purchased contact lenses from 800-Contacts
within the past four years while residing in this judicial district; (4) 800-Contacts
overcharged Plaintiff, deprived her of alternative offerings, and delivered contact
lenses to her in this judicial district; and (5) Plaintiff suffered antitrust injury in this
judicial district because of 800-Contacts’ challenged conduct.
IV. COMMON ALLEGATIONS
6. Plaintiff re-pleads and incorporates by reference each of the preceding
allegations.
7. Market Definitions Are Unnecessary. Plaintiff’s claim arises from 800-
Contacts’ per se violations of Section 1 – namely, its organization and enforcement of
a bid-rigging conspiracy and its further organization of a horizontal market-allocation
scheme. In an abundance of caution, however, Plaintiff has alleged the relevant
markets at issue and has pled how 800-Contacts’ conduct has harmed competitive
processes in these markets. 
8. The Relevant Markets at Issue. The relevant markets in which 800-
Contacts has committed antitrust offenses are as follows: (1) the market for the sale of
contact lenses in the United States as well as a submarket for the online sale of
contact lenses in the United States (collectively, the “contact lens markets”); and (2)
the market for search-engine advertising in the United States. Plaintiff and all
members of the proposed class are consumers in each of these markets.
//
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9. Contact Lenses Constitute a Relevant Product Market. Contact
lenses are medical devices used to improve vision, treat defective vision, and/or
improve the physical appearance of the user. For purposes of antitrust review, contact
lenses constitute a relevant category of products whose sale 800-Contacts has
unlawfully restrained.
10. A contact lens is composed of specialized material and encased in a
special film. It is thin, curved, naturally clear, and specially shaped in order to be
placed onto a human eye. Contact lenses are sold in pairs and placed directly on the
surface of a user’s eyes in order to correct or improve the user’s vision or for
cosmetic reasons, such as changing the apparent hue and shape of the user’s eyes.
11. Most consumers who purchase contact lenses use them for the same
reason that others wear eye-glasses – to correct a vision impairment. For many users,
however, contact lenses and eye-glasses are not reasonably interchangeable
substitutes for one another because of the below-pled circumstances. 
12. Many users strongly prefer contact lenses to eye-glasses because contact
lenses correct or improve their vision without burdening them with the perceived
disadvantages of wearing eye-glasses – their appearance and imposition of
discomfort. Many users of contact lenses dislike how eye-glasses make them appear
to others and/or find eye-glasses to be uncomfortable or awkward to wear. 
13. Many users of contact lenses also dislike how eye-glasses readily
accumulate dust, moisture and/or perspiration. 
14. Many users of contact lenses find that eye-glasses are ill-suited or
unsuitable for use when they participate in sporting activities, other outdoor activities
or activities that require robust physical exertion. 
15. Contact lenses also afford better peripheral vision than do most kinds of
eye-glasses. 
16. In addition, some users wear contact lenses only for cosmetic reasons
rather than to correct any vision impairment. These users wear contact lenses only in
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order to alter the apparent hue (color) of their eyes or to give a different apparent
shape to their eyes. Many users of contact lenses report that wearing them makes
them feel much more physically attractive, and many who wear them to correct a
vision impairment also do so for cosmetic reasons. 
17. Some users of contact lenses wear them so that they can also wear sun-
glasses, goggles or other kinds of eye-wear without having special fittings placed on
eye-glasses. 
18. For all of the foregoing reasons, contact lenses are medical devices for
which there is no reasonably interchangeable substitute product. There is only one
other product – eye-glasses – that in some cases can perform only some of the same
functions. But owing to the above matters, those who wear contact lenses have such a
strong preference for them that they would not stop wearing them and would not
switch to eye-glasses even if the prices for contact lenses were to increase by a
statistically significant amount for a non-transitory duration, which in antitrust
jurisprudence is known as a “SSNIP” – a statistically significant, non-transitory
increase in price. Rather, most users of contact lenses would continue to purchase and
use them even if their price were increased by a SSNIP – a circumstance that means
that contact lenses constitute a distinct relevant product according to the current
Horizontal Merger Guidelines used by the United States Department of Justice for
purposes of establishing the relevant product market in antitrust cases (i.e.,
determining the relevant category of products at issue for purposes of performing an
antitrust evaluation of the practices challenged under the antitrust laws). 
19. For many users, switching from contact lenses to eye-glasses is not even
an option at any price, since they use contact lenses for purposes that eye-glasses
cannot fulfill, such as cosmetic uses or the use of corrective lenses at sporting events.
20. By and large, there is either very limited or no cross-elasticity of demand
between contact lenses and eye-glasses, and there is no cross-elasticity of demand at
all between contact lenses and any other product. For most users of contact lenses,
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eye-glasses are not reasonably interchangeable substitute products because they do
not afford the singular advantages offered only by contact lenses. For these users,
there exists a distinct category of products that is limited to the various kinds and
brands of contact lenses.
21. Sellers of contact lenses set their prices after carefully considering what
other sellers of them charge, and they pay only passing attention to the prices charged
for eye-glasses, since the two categories of products are not directly in competition
with one another for most sales. 
22. Manufacturers of contact lenses, distributors, online sellers, brick-and-
mortar retailers, consumers and industry experts regard the sale of contact lenses in
the United States as a distinct category of sales. The sale of these products is
characterized by distinct demand curves, specialized manufacturers, specialized
distribution channels, specialized retailers, distinct customers, and distinct uses. 
23. For purposes of the present antitrust review, contact lenses constitute the
relevant product market. It would be inappropriate to include any other product in the
relevant product market when conducting an antitrust review of the business practices
placed in issue by the present complaint.
24. Contact Lenses Are Sold in a National Market. The manufacturers of
contact lenses market their products for distribution in the United States. They sell
their products directly to specialized wholesale distributors, retailers, health-care
purchasing organizations, healthcare providers, and others. 
25. Defendant, 800-Contacts, is an online retailer that sells contact lenses
online to customers located across the United States. All other online retailers of
contact lenses likewise make sales to customers located across the United States.
Online retailers face competition from one another and from brick-and-mortar
retailers that make sales in localities and regions within the United States.
26. For purposes of evaluating Plaintiff’s present antitrust challenge, the
relevant geographic market for the sale of contact lenses cannot be larger than the
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United States. In the United States, contact lenses are regulated as medical devices by
the United States Food and Drug Administration, which imposes special regulatory
requirements on their manufacture, distribution and sale that are not imposed on
contact lenses that are made, distributed or sold abroad. In addition, in the United
States contact lenses are sold in distinct “sales channels” that are not used to sell
these products in any other region of the world. 
27. The geographic market for contact lenses is therefore no larger than the
United States.
28. How Contact Lenses Are Sold in the United States. In the United
States, experts estimate that slightly more than forty million adults wear contact
lenses, or approximately 16.7% of the adult population of the United States (an adult
is defined as someone who is age eighteen or older). In addition, approximately four
million adolescents and children also wear contact lenses. 
29. Industry experts estimate that sales of contact lenses in the United States
in 2015 generated revenues of approximately $2.7 billion. 
30. Users of contact lenses replace them at periodic intervals, such as once
per year, once per month, once every other week, once every week, or once every day.
Many users prefer disposable contact lenses and replace them every day. Most users
replace their contact lenses at least once every month or at shorter intervals. 
31. Many users originally purchase contact lenses directly from a health-care
provider, such as an optometrist, optician, contact lens technician or ophthalmologist.
These health-care providers help users to determine which size and type of contact
lens are best suited to their particular requirements and help them to place the lenses
on the users’ eyes. Many users make their own purchases directly from online sellers
and/or brick-and-mortar retailers after receiving initial fittings from health-care
providers. 
32. The Submarket for Online Sales of Contact Lenses in the United
States. Like many other goods, contact lenses are increasingly advertised and sold
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over the internet rather than in brick-and-mortar stores: in the United States, health-
care providers, specialized distributors of medical devices, and users by the millions
browse online to consider and shop for contact lenses, place online orders, make
online payment arrangements, and have specified contact lenses delivered to them by
online sellers.
33. In the United States, online sales of contact lenses constituted 16.7% of
all sales of contact lenses in 2012 (the most recent date for which Plaintiff has this
information). The percentage of these sales made online has since increased.
34. For purposes of antitrust review, there exists a distinct submarket for the
online sale of contact lenses in the United States. In this submarket, there are
specialized sellers, distribution channels, logistics, promotional strategies, demand
curves, and prices, and there exist a distinct subset of customers – the healthcare
providers, medical device suppliers and especially the consumers who look only to
online sellers in order to purchase contact lenses. There is widespread recognition
among all of these market participants that the online sale of contact lenses has
become a distinct market or submarket within a larger market for the sale of contact
lenses in the United States.
35. Online Sales, Generally Described. An online sale is one that is made
on the internet. It is typically conducted at the website of an online seller, which,
crucially, serves as the online seller’s point of sale – i.e., its store. It is the place
where an online seller shows and promotes its products and concludes sales. 
36. In a typical transaction, a customer visits an online seller’s website,
reviews information about the seller’s products, and, if persuaded to make a purchase,
makes a purchase by placing an order, providing an electronic payment, and
providing delivery instructions. After confirming the payment, the seller arranges to
have the products delivered to the customer’s designated location. The entire
transaction is conducted online and electronically, except for the physical delivery of
the products (which is a separate operation that also depends on the use of online
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logistics). This is the typical manner in which online sales are conducted. 
37. To make sales, an online seller hosts a website that provides information
about its products and processes final sales. 
38. To attract prospective customers to its website (i.e., to its store), an
online seller strives to make its website attractive, useful, informative,
accommodating, and as noticeable as possible. 
39. To this end, a proficient online seller continually strives to create and
maintain a website that internet search engines such as Google and Bing will list in
the internet search findings that they offer in response to users’ search queries.
Without having customers steered to its website by internet search engines, an online
seller would largely lack customers and therefore could not make sales. Without the
steering, most prospective customers would never come across its website at all.
40. Stated the other way around, internet search engines help to steer
customers to online stores where they can find the goods and services that they seek.
For example, if a user runs a query for “contact lenses, online,” a search engine such
as Google or Bing will list in order of “relevance” various websites that it determines
offer relevant information in response to the search query, such as the websites of
various online sellers of contact lenses. An online seller of contact lenses will
therefore strive to create and maintain a website that will be prominently listed in
response to any such search query.
41. An online seller can reach prospective customers simply by hosting a
useful, informative website. When a prospective customer runs a search query in a
search engine about a topic on which the seller’s website offers useful information,
the search engine might list the website as one of its findings. Users will be thereby
directed to the online seller’s website.
42. Many online sellers, however, are not content merely to develop
informative websites and do not limit their promotional efforts to the simple hosting
of a website. In addition, they pay for advertising, whose purpose is to provide
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information about their products and especially to attract users to their websites. 
43. To this end, an online seller can pay to run a “banner ad” on popular
websites, so that all visitors to the popular websites will see the advertisement and
possibly clink on an embedded link within the advertisement in order to visit seller’s
website. Yahoo.com is one popular website that sells and displays such “banner ads.”
44. An online seller can also run advertisements in traditional media, such as
newspapers, magazines, broadcast and cable television, and broadcast radio: the
advertisements can tout the online seller’s products and identify and promote its
website (“visit our crazy website at wow dot com!”)
45. By far the most effective advertising for an online seller is search-engine
advertising, which is specifically targeted to users who see the seller’s advertisement
at the very time when they are likely looking for the products or services that the
seller offers. Search-engine advertising is run alongside internet search results that
internet search engines provide in response to internet users’ search queries. 
46. Specifically, an online seller can pay for advertising that will only appear
alongside search findings that a search engine gives in response to designated search
queries. Online sellers pay search engines such as Google or Bing to run their
advertisements in this manner. By this means, an online seller can specifically target
its advertising to prospective customers rather than the public at large.
47. Ultimately, the aim of all advertising run by online sellers is to promote
their goods or services to customers and to attract customers to their websites. The
most effective advertising for this purpose is the search-engine advertising that the
online sellers pay search engines to place alongside search results that the search
engines give in response to specified search queries.
48. Online Search Engines. Online search engines act as private curators of
the extraordinary if not inconceivable volume of information available to internet
users on the “worldwide web” of internet connections.
//
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49. Using extraordinary resources that include state-of-the-art computer
programs, an internet search engine continually combs over and organizes in myriad
ways all of the available information in the worldwide web. It is then able to guide an
internet user who uses its search-engine facilities to find specific information located
in the worldwide web. For example, if a user seeks information on the internet about
whether peanuts are healthy food, she can hazard the names of likely websites that
might exist and provide such information (e.g., “peanuts.com”) or she can go to a
search engine such as google and run an appropriate search query (e.g., “are peanuts
good for you?”). Google will then list various websites that it believes will provide
the requested information along with hyperlinks to these websites, so that the user can
effortlessly proceed to them. 
50. It is the search engines that in this manner organize the information
available on the worldwide web, making it practically accessible to internet users.
Without this service, it would be exceedingly difficult or impossible for an internet
user to find relevant information on the worldwide web: an internet user who lacks a
search engine would be akin to a person who finds herself inside a vast library
building that holds millions of books that are not catalogued or placed in any
particular order. Indeed, an internet user without a search engine would be at even a
greater disadvantage than our hapless library visitor in the foregoing example. Search
engines therefore perform an indispensable service that is principally funded by the
search-engine advertising that they sell to online sellers.
51. Search engines use algorithms to perform their essential work. When an
internet user enters a search query in the search engine, the search engine responds by
running highly complex algorithms to direct the user to the information in the
worldwide web that it determines is most “relevant” to the user’s query. 
52. Search engines are private entities that are funded by the search-engine
advertising that they sell to online advertisers, who are principally online sellers.
When a search engine provides a search result in response to a query, it typically will
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also display paid advertising alongside its search findings. It is this paid search-
engine advertising that provides the principal source of revenues for the search
engine, making possible its ability to provide internet search services, which are
indispensable services in the modern era. The paid advertisements fund its activities –
the providing of ordered search results in response to online search queries.
53. Search-Engine Advertising. Search engines sell their advertising
principally to online sellers, and they make these sales by conducting ongoing online
auctions, which operate as follows. Each search engine allows an advertiser to give it
ongoing instructions as to when it wishes to have its advertisements run and how
much it will pay for the privilege. To this end, the advertiser designates specific
“keywords” and “negative keywords”  as well as various other parameters. These
keywords, negative keywords and other parameters serve as the advertiser’s
instructions to the search engine. These instructions are also accompanied by the
advertiser’s bidding information – its statement of how much it is willing to pay to
have each of its advertisements run in response to qualifying search queries. These
bids can be very complex, and the advertiser can change them constantly. For
example, the advertiser might be willing to pay one amount for a query that contains
three particular keywords and that is run in the evening where the user is located, but
another price for a different query made at a different time of day, and so on and so
forth.
54. The keywords, negative keywords and other parameters that online
sellers provide to search engines serve as a set of instructions to them: “please run our
advertisement whenever these criteria are met, and we will pay you as follows every
time you run our advertisement.” Online sellers accompany these instructions with
complicated bids that indicate how much they will pay for every possible running of
any of their advertisements. The search engines provide computer programs that
greatly simplify and facilitate the online sellers’ provision of this information.
//
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55. A keyword is an instruction to run an advertisement in response to any
internet search query that includes the keyword (e.g., “run our ad showing the
smiling, healthy woman eating a slice of blueberry pie whenever the term ‘pie’
appears in a search query.”). A negative keyword is an instruction not to run the
advertisement if a negative keyword appears in a query that also includes a keyword
(e.g., do not run our ad in any query that includes the word ‘pizza,’ even if it also
includes any of our keywords.”)
56. For example, an online seller of cakes and pies might list as its keywords
“cake,” “pie,” “batter,” “flour,” “chocolate” and “desert,” and it might list as negative
keywords “pizza” and “survival”: it wants to show its advertisements to internet users
who seek information about cakes, pies, after-dinner deserts and such matters, but not
to users who seek information about pizza pies or surviving in the desert. 
57. An online seller will therefore instruct a search engine to run its
specified advertisement in response to search queries that contain one or some
combination of its keywords, but not to do so if the query also contains one or some
combination of negative keywords. It will also likely provide other parameters,
varying which advertisements it wishes to run according to what search is made, at
what time of day, from which location, etc. 
58. When providing this information, an online seller will also provide its
bidding for its advertisements, stating the highest price it is willing to pay to run a
given advertisement in response to given internet queries.
59. Each online search engine conducts permanent, ongoing evaluations of
advertisers’ instructions and bids, and it also considers how relevant each proposed
advertisement will be to each specified search query. On this basis it decides (1)
which paid advertisements it will run in response to each search query, and (2) the
ordering of these paid advertisements. 
60. Typically, an online seller who is willing to pay the most for its
advertising will have its advertisement displayed first, and each advertiser’s
PLAINTIFF’S CLASS-ACTION COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE, ETC.
-14-
Case 3:16-cv-05400-JSC   Document 1   Filed 09/21/16   Page 15 of 34
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
advertisement will be displayed in order, according to how much each advertiser is
willing to pay.
61. 800-Contacts’ Online Sales of Contact Lenses. As pled above, contact
lenses are increasingly sold by online sellers, who make most of their sales by using
online advertisements to attract customers to their websites, at which they make their
promotions and sales.
62. 800-Contacts was an innovative pioneer in online sales of contact lenses,
and over time it became the largest online seller. It now makes approximately 50% of
all online sales of contact lenses in the United States. It is the dominant seller in a
distinct submarket for the sale of contact lenses in the United States – their online
sale.
63. Like all online sellers, 800-Contacts makes all of its sales from its
website, which prospective customers visit in order to consider and possibly purchase
its offerings.  Like most online sellers, 800-Contacts uses internet advertising to
attract customers to its websites, and it uses search-engine advertising in order to
target its advertising specifically at internet browsers who seek information about
contact lenses. 
64. 800-Contacts’ Rivals Tried to Compete Against It. 800-Contacts’
success naturally invited competition. Other sellers of contact lenses established
competing websites and ran their own online advertisements in order to introduce
their own online products. Some of these rivals claimed that their contact lenses were
better in quality or specially adapted to particular niche uses. Some offered lower
prices than those offered by 800-Contacts for the same goods. Some offered
innovative terms of sale or other services that 800-Contacts did not offer.
65. 800-Contacts Responded By Suppressing Competition. Rather than
respond to this competitive threat by striving to improve its products and lower its
prices, 800-Contacts went to elaborate lengths to protect its “internet turf” from
competition. 
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66. To this end 800-Contacts circulated cease-and-desist letters to at least
fifteen of its direct competitors that also sold contact lenses in the United States by
means of online sales. In these cease-and-desist letters, 800-Contacts threatened to
involve each of these business rivals in baseless trademark litigation that would be
costly and disruptive, unless the rival assented to its proposed settlement agreement.
Fourteen of the targeted rivals acquiesced and assented to its proposed settlement
agreements, which included anticompetitive terms that constitute per se violations of
Section 1. Plaintiff lacks the names of these fourteen rival sellers because the Federal
Trade Commission, which has investigated this matter, has redacted them from the
public version of its complaint, but Plaintiff will disclose these names after she has
had occasion to conduct appropriate discovery in order to ascertain them.
67. By these agreements, made in response to 800-Contacts’ threat to initiate
baseless litigation, 800-Contacts and the fourteen acquiescent direct competitors
agreed by a series of bilateral agreements to do the following: (1) coordinate their
bidding for search-engine advertising; (2) coordinate their competition and abstain
from competing against one another for specified sales leads; and (3) coordinate and
suppress their internet advertising and dissemination of information about their
products and offers, so that only one online seller, usually 800-Contacts, would be
permitted to show its advertising in response to specified sales leads.
68. More specifically, 800-Contacts and each of the above fourteen rivals
agreed that only 800-Contacts would submit bids to run search-engine advertisements
in response to any search query that included the term “800-Contacts” or any of 800-
Contacts other trademarks, and that none of the rivals would bid to run their own
advertisements in response to any such search query. Similarly, 800-Contacts and
each of these rivals agreed that 800-Contacts would not bid to run its advertisements
in response to any search inquiry that included mention of the rival’s name or any of
its other trademarks. (Plaintiff does not know how 800-Contracts and its rivals agreed
to handle search queries that included both 800-Contacts’ name and a rival’s name.)
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69. 800-Contacts and each of the above rivals further agreed that each would
list the other’s name and other trademarks as “negative keywords” in its instructions
to search engines. If a customer included 800-Contacts’ name or other trademarks in a
search query, none of 800-Contacts’ fourteen rivals would permit its advertising to
appear in response to the query. 
70. Since online sellers make their sales by attracting internet users to their
websites, these fourteen agreements constituted an effectual market-allocation
scheme. Whenever a prospective customer ran a search query on the internet that
made any mention of 800-Contacts’ name or other trademarks, only 800-Contacts
would bid to run advertisements, and only 800-Contacts would show its
advertisements to the prospective customer. For these sales leads, only 800-Contacts
would try to make sales, and its above fourteen rivals expressly agreed to refrain
from doing so.
71. The several agreements between 800-Contacts and its fourteen rivals
concerning bids for search-engine advertising constitute fourteen instances of
unlawful bid-rigging as well as an overall, coordinated bid-rigging scheme. Bid-
rigging in turn is a per se violation of Section 1. This matter is further explained
below.
72. The several agreements between 800-Contacts and its fourteen rivals
concerning which among them would try to make sales in response to specified
search queries constitute an unlawful market-allocation scheme, which is a second
per se violation of Section 1. This matter is further explained below.
73. 800-Contacts used improper tactics to coerce the fourteen acquiescent
competitors to assent to these anticompetitive, unlawful agreements. To force them to
do so, 800-Contacts threatened to bring a succession of objectively baseless claims
against them without regard to the probable outcome of these claims, and it actually
litigated and lost one objectively baseless litigation against a fifteenth rival that
refused to yield to its demands.
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74. The trademark litigation that 800-Contacts threatened to bring and
actually brought in one case was indeed “objectively baseless”: in its cease-and-desist
letters, it threatened to bring substantial trademark claims against any rival whose
search-engine advertising appeared in response to any search query that mentioned
any of 800-Contacts’ trademarks. According to these cease-and-desist letters, any
advertisement that so appeared constituted a violation of 800-Contact's trademarks –
an absurd proposition that 800-Contacts never had any reasonable basis to make.
75. If this theory of trademark infringement were correct, a company could
register its trademarks, closely monitor Google analytics, and sue every other
company whose ads were run in response to any query that mentioned its name or any
of its other trademarks, even if the advertisements themselves in no way confused
customers into incorrectly believing that the advertisers were authorized sellers of its
products – which alone is the standard for determining whether an advertisement has
infringed upon a trademark. This proposed application of trademark law, if accepted,
would be oppressive, would impair the constitutional right of free speech, would not
reasonably promote the proper aims of trademarks, and would encourage trademark
trolls to engulf the courts in trademark litigation that did not protect anyone's
trademarks, but only resulted in the senseless enrichment of trademark holders whose
names happened to appear in internet search queries.
76. The cost of litigating these points likely appeared prohibitive to
800-Contacts' rivals, each of which operated on low margins in order to make profits
by selling contact lenses at low prices. With one exception, the smaller rivals chose
not to oppose 800-Contacts’ calculated threats to litigate baseless claims against
them, but instead acquiesced in the above anticompetitive, unlawful agreements. The
one rival that refused to yield was obliged to oppose the claims and incur costs to do
so. Unsurprisingly, this hold-out rival prevailed at summary judgment and then again
on appeal. See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1256 (10th Cir.
2013). 
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77. As for the fourteen rivals that acquiesced, 800-Contacts agreed to drop
its claims against them in exchange for their acceptance of the above agreements,
which in turn include the above anticompetitive provisions, which constitute two per
se antitrust violations: (1) an unlawful conspiracy to rig bids; and (2) an unlawful
conspiracy among direct competitors to allocate sales and suppress advertising. By
these provisions, 800-Contracts succeeded at having its threatening rivals desist from
competing against it in its designated "internet turf" – all internet queries that so
much as mentioned its name or any of its other trademarks.
78. 800-Contacts' Bid-Rigging Conspiracy. As pled above, 800-Contacts'
settlement agreements obliged each coerced rival to agree not to bid in online
auctions to run paid advertisements that would appear in response to any online
search query that mentioned 800-Contacts’ name or any of its other trademarks
(including all possible variations). 800-Contacts agreed reciprocally not to bid in
online auctions for advertisements that would run in response to any online search
query that mentioned any of its rivals' trademarks (including all possible
variations).These agreements constitute unlawful bid-rigging, which is a per se
violation of Section 1. See United States v. Guthrie, 814 F. Supp. 942, 950 (E.D.
Wash. 1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1994) (bid rigging, which is a per se
violation of Section 1, is “an agreement to interfere with competition for a transaction
conducted by bid.”); United States v. Reicher, 983 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1992)
(bid-rigging is an agreement between direct competitors to make or withhold bids or
specified contract offers; it constitutes a per se violation of Section 1).
79. The immediate victims of 800-Contacts’ bid-rigging scheme were the
search engines, which lost sales revenues, and prospective purchasers of contact
lenses, who were deprived of information about the products that they wished to
purchase as well as competition for their business among rival sellers of these
products. Since there was a lack of competition for their business, they inevitably
paid higher prices for contact lenses that they purchased from 800-Contacts than they
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would have done in a competitive market. That was the whole point.
80. 800-Contacts’ rivals were also harmed even though they were coerced
participants in the scheme, since they were forced to refrain from bidding to run ads
in response to the many queries that mentioned 800-Contacts’ well-known name,
even though their ads were not likely to confuse users into believing that they were
authorized by 800-Contacts to sell its products. For example, none of these rivals
could bid to run internet advertising in response to a search query for “contact lenses
offered by 800-Contacts or any other online seller.”
81. 800-Contacts' Scheme to Allocate Markets and Suppress
Advertising. As pled above, 800-Contacts’ settlement agreements also obliged its
rivals to take positive steps to ensure that their ads would not run in response to an
online search query that mentioned any of 800-Contacts trademarks, such as a search
for “contact lenses from 1-800-Contacts or any other online seller.” 800-Contacts
reciprocally agreed not to run its ads in response to any search query that included
any of its rivals’ trademarks. To give effect to these agreements, 800-Contacts and
each rival specified the other's trademarks as "negative keywords," which as
explained above serve as an online seller’s instructions to search engines not to run
its advertising whenever a designated negative keyword appears in a search query.
82. By these provisions in the settlement agreements, 800-Contacts and
fourteen of its direct competitors agreed that for specified search queries only one of
them would provide advertising and thereby offer products. This practice therefore
constituted a market-allocation scheme, which is a per se violation of Section 1. See
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011)
(market- allocation schemes among direct competitors are per se unlawful under
Section 1); Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50, 111 S. Ct. 401, 402-
03 (1990) (“[A]greements between competitors to allocate territories to minimize
competition are illegal.... Such agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether
the parties split a market within which both do business or whether they merely
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reserve one market for one and another for the other.”)
83. This practice also constitutes a conspiracy by direct competitors to
suppress advertising - a practice that has been challenged in cases such as California
Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 526 U.S. 756, 119 S.Ct. 1604
(1999) and Nat'l Soc. of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 98 S. Ct.
1355 (1978). In the present matter, the suppression of advertising was imposed only
to ensure that each competitor would advertise and sell products only in its own
designated “online territory.” It was not even arguably used to further a claimed
benefit for consumers, such as ensuring that dental patients are not deceived
(California Dental) or that engineers refrain from quoting prices when bidding for
work so as to avoid the temptation to propose inexpensive but substandard structures
(Professional Engineers). The present case is therefore best regarded as a
market-allocation scheme that depends on the suppression of advertising, since the
sellers are online providers that principally make sales by running online
advertisements.
84. 800-Contact's market-allocation scheme deprived customers of
information about contact lenses that they otherwise would have received from rival
sellers’ advertising. Even worse, the scheme deprived them of the benefits of
competition for their business. Whenever a prospective customer ran a covered search
query, he or she failed to receive advertising or competing offers from the excluded
rival providers.
85. More generally, 800-Contact purposefully used its restraints of trade to
mislead customers into believing that it was a true discounter that offered contact
lenses at discount prices, when in fact it suppressed bidding, competition and the
dissemination of advertising precisely in order to ensure that true discounters would
be less likely or unable to display their offers to prospective customers.
86. Harm to Competition. 800-Contacts’ bid-rigging scheme and its
scheme to allocate sales and suppress advertising harmed competitive processes in the
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following relevant markets: (1) the contact lense markets – i.e., the market for the sale
of contact lenses in the United States as well as the submarket for the online sale of
contact lenses in the United States; and (2) the market for search-engine advertising
in the United States.
87. In the contact lens markets, 800-Contacts used the above-pled practices
to suppress competition for sales; this in turn permitted it to charge supracompetitive
prices for its contact lenses – i.e., prices that were higher than those that it could have
charged in a competitive market without losing substantial sales to rivals. That was
the whole point of its conduct and anticompetitive schemes. 
88. Although 800-Contacts’ trade restraints did not affect every prospective
customer and instead reached only those that ran specified search queries, these trade
restraints reached enough prospective customers so that 800-Contacts could protect
itself sufficiently from competition in order to maintain supracompetitive prices
and/or practice price discrimination by charging supracompetitive prices to those
users who arrived at its site after using one of the specified search queries. Moreover,
the general effect of these trade restraints was to limit competition on price and
quality among rival online sellers of contact lenses - a circumstance that by itself
permitted 800-Contacts to charge supracompetitive prices to all of its customers.
89. At a later stage of these proceedings, Plaintiff will furnish econometric
evidence that 800-Contacts charged supracompetitive prices in the contact lens
markets, and she will provide an econometric quantification of the probable amount
of the overcharges (the amount by which 800-Contacts charged prices that exceeded
competitive prices).
90. In the above contact lens markets, 800-Contacts also suppressed
advertising, which is the dissemination of information about products and a form of
output that is useful to consumers in these markets. 
91. 800-Contacts therefore restricted output in the contact lens markets by
charging supracompetitive prices, which inevitably restrict output, and also by
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suppressing advertising and the dissemination of information about products, which
is a form of output.
92. In the contact lens markets, 800-Contacts also used its above-pled
practices to impair or suppress (1) competition for sales and (2) its rivals’ ability to
offer financing terms that it did not offer, alternative services that it did not offer, and
more responsive and timely service than it offered. In this manner, 800-Contacts
further restricted output in the contact lens markets by means of its above-pled
practices.
93. 800-Contacts’ challenged practices therefore harmed competitive
processes in the contact lens markets: these practices resulted in the imposition of
supracompetitive prices and the further restriction of output by other means.
94. 800-Contacts’ challenged practices also harmed competitive processes in
the market for search-engine advertising in the United States. In this market, 800-
Contacts used the above-pled practices in order to depress the amounts it and other
online sellers of contact lenses paid to search engines to run their advertisements in
response to specified search queries, since these direct competitors agreed not to bid
against one another to run their respective advertisements whenever the name or other
trademark of one of them appeared in a search query. The above-pled practices thus
suppressed all rival bids to run search-engine advertisements under specified
circumstances. 
95. Not only did these competitors agree not to bid against one another, but
they further agreed that they would not run competing advertising for specified
internet search queries.
96. By preventing its rivals from bidding for or showing internet advertising
in response to specified search queries, 800-Contacts restricted the output of
advertising in the market for search-engine advertising. Users who ran search queries
received less advertising and information than they would have done in a competitive
market for search-engine advertising.
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97. 800-Contacts’ agreements with fourteen of its direct competitors
therefore harmed competitive processes in the national market for search-engine
advertising by suppressing competitive bidding to run search-engine advertisements
and by suppressing search-engine advertising.
98. 800-Contacts’ challenged practices therefore harmed competition in the
relevant markets placed in issue in the present case. Plaintiff need not make any such
showing to prevail on her single cause of action, since 800-Contacts’ challenged
practices should be condemned as per se violations of Section 1, but Plaintiff has pled
this claim under three alternative standards of review and is prepared if necessary to
prove harm to competitive processes in each of the above markets.
99. Plaintiff’s Antitrust Injuries. As pled more fully below, Plaintiff and
each member of the proposed class suffered antitrust injuries in proximate
consequence of the anticompetitive character, purpose, and effect of 800-Contacts’
bid-rigging scheme and scheme to allocate sales and suppress advertising: they each
paid supracompetitive prices for contact lenses that they purchased online from 800-
Contacts within the past four years; and they each were deprived of consumer choice,
which is a form of antitrust injury. These matters are pled more fully in the following
section of this complaint.
V. CLASS-ACTION ALLEGATIONS
100. Plaintiff re-pleads and incorporates by reference each of the preceding
allegations. 
101. Plaintiff made online purchases of contact lenses from 800-Contacts
within the past four years. For at least one of these purchases, she recalls having run a
search query to look for online sellers of contact lenses. She was misled by 800-
Contacts’ online advertising and promotions to believe that 800-Contacts was a bona
fide discounter that offered the best possible prices for contact lenses and did not
realize that it used the above trade restraints to charge supracompetitive prices,
restrain competition, and suppress its rivals’ dissemination of their lower prices and
PLAINTIFF’S CLASS-ACTION COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE, ETC.
-24-
Case 3:16-cv-05400-JSC   Document 1   Filed 09/21/16   Page 25 of 34
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
alternative offers and services.
102. Had 800-Contacts not employed the above-pled restraints of trade, it
would have been obliged to charge competitive rather than supracompetitive prices
for the contact lenses that it sold to Plaintiff. She has been harmed because she paid
to 800-Contacts the difference between its supracompetitive prices and competitive
prices.
103. In addition, if 800-Contacts had not employed the above-pled restraints
of trade, Plaintiff likely would have been exposed to paid advertising by rival
providers when she ran the above search query. Since she was not exposed to this
advertising, she was deprived of a corresponding opportunity to consider the rival
providers’ competing products and services. This loss of choice, imposed by 800-
Contacts’ above-pled restraints, is a form of antitrust injury and harm to Plaintiff.
See Glen Holly Entm't, Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 343 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir.), opinion
amended on denial of reh'g, 352 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2003) (“One form of antitrust
injury is coercive activity that prevents its victims from making free choices between
market alternatives.”) (internal quotation omitted).
104. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated persons have been directly
harmed by the anticompetitive character, purpose, and effect of 800-Contacts’ bid-
rigging conspiracy and scheme to allocate sales and suppress advertising. Plaintiff,
who belongs to the proposed class, now seeks to represent all legal persons located in
the United States who during the past four years overpaid for contact lenses that they
purchased online from 800-Contacts because of its bid-rigging conspiracy and/or its
related scheme to allocate sales and suppress advertising.
105. By suppressing its rivals’ advertising and ability to make sales to
customers that ran specified search queries, 800-Contacts was able to charge higher
prices to these customers than it would have been able to do had it faced competition
from its rivals for these sales. At a later stage of these proceedings, Plaintiff will
provide econometric and other expert evidence of the amounts that 800-Contacts
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overcharged for these sales because of its above-pled antitrust violations. 
106. Because of 800-Contacts’ above-pled anticompetitive practices, Plaintiff
and each member of the proposed class overpaid for contact lenses that they
purchased from 800-Contacts during the stated period. It is possible to develop
econometric models that can furnish reasonable estimates of the amounts of these
overcharges and to provide appropriate pro rata compensation to each member of the
proposed class. Because of 800-Contacts’ above-pled anticompetitive practices,
Plaintiff and each member of the proposed class were deprived of consumer choice
and alternative promotions of products and services that were different from, better
than, and/or less expensive than those offered by 800-Contacts. Unlike 800-Contacts,
some online sellers of contact lenses were bona fide discounters that offered or
systematically matched the lowest available prices for these products, but 800-
Contacts was able to prevent them from making themselves known to prospective
customers by its above-pled restraints of trade.
107. Plaintiff proposes to litigate the present case as a class-action because
her claim against 800-Contacts satisfies the required criteria for litigating a claim as a
class-action. These criteria are set forth at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and are
addressed directly below.
108. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff now brings a proposed class-action on behalf of herself and the
following proposed class of similarly situated individuals:
All persons in the United States who made online purchases of
contact lens products from 800-Contacts for personal and
household use and not for resale from September 21, 2012 until
the date on which class notice is given.
Excluded from the proposed class is Defendant (800-Contacts),
any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest or that has
a controlling interest in Defendant, and Defendant's legal
representatives, assignees, and successors. Also excluded are the
judge and magistrate judge to whom this case is assigned and any
member of the judge’s immediate family and the magistrate
judge’s immediate family.
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109. Numerosity. The proposed class consists of many thousands of persons.
It is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
110. Common Issues Predominate. Each member of the proposed class
claims that 800-Contacts employed unlawful restraints of trade in violation of Section
1, and that by so doing it overcharged each member for contact lenses that it sold to
them and also deprived each member of consumer choice. The principal issues of fact
and law that arise from this claim are common to the entire class, and these issues
predominate. Any issue of fact or law that is peculiar to individual members is merely
ancillary to the common, predominant issues. 
111. The common issues of fact and law that are predominant in this case
include the following:
(1) Were 800-Contacts’ several agreements with its rivals unlawful per se
under Section 1 because each agreement obliged each rival to refrain
from bidding to run search-engine advertising in response to any search
query that included mention of 800-Contacts’ name or any of its other
trademarks?
(2) Were 800-Contacts’ several agreements with its rivals unlawful under
Section 1 because each agreement required each rival to withhold its
search-engine advertising from any response given to a search query that
included mention of 800-Contacts’ name or any of its other trademarks? 
(3) Using a “quick-look” analysis, were 800-Contacts’ several agreements
with its rivals unlawful restraints of trade in violation of Section 1? 
(4) Under the “Rule of Reason,” were 800-Contacts’ several agreements
with its rivals unlawful restraints of trade in violation of Section 1? 
(5) By approximately how much was 800-Contacts able to overcharge for
contact lenses that it sold in the United States during the past four years
because of its agreements with its rivals? How should these overcharges
be allocated among each member of the proposed class?
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112. 800-Contacts has engaged in a common course of conduct toward
Plaintiff and members of the proposed class.  The common issues arising from this
conduct that affect Plaintiff and class members predominate over any individual
issues.
113. Plaintiff’s Claim Is a Typical Claim. Plaintiff is a direct purchaser who
within the past four years made online purchases of contact lenses from 800-Contacts.
She overpaid for these contact lenses by paying supracompetitive prices for them
after conducting an online query for contact lenses, and she was deprived of
consumer choice and alternative offers of products and services that were different
from, better than, and/or less expensive than those offered by 800-Contacts. She
therefore has a typical claim that is essentially identical to the claim held by of each
member of the proposed class, and her claim depends on the adjudication of the
above-listed common issues of fact and law.
114. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
proposed class. Plaintiff has retained competent, capable attorneys who have
significant experience in antitrust litigation as well as complex and class-action
litigation, including consumer class-actions. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed
to prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the proposed class and have the
financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have interests that are
contrary to, or in conflict with, those of the proposed class. 
115. Plaintiff is therefore an appropriate representative of the proposed class
members who can litigate the present antitrust challenge proficiently on behalf of the
proposed class.
116. Superiority.  A class-action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the present controversy. Adjudication of the
common issues of fact and law in a single action will promote judicial economy, nor
would it be practical to oblige each class member to litigate his or her claim
independently. Doing so would be cost-prohibitive and so would never occur; but if
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each claimant were to litigate his or her claim separately, these litigations would
necessarily result in duplicative procedures and might result in inconsistent
adjudications of identical issues of fact and law. 
117. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Appropriate. Plaintiff’s proposed
class-action is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because 800-Contacts
has committed the same legal wrong against all members of the proposed class, and
on behalf of all class members Plaintiff seeks final injunctive relief against 800-
Contacts in order to prevent it from persisting in its anticompetitive conduct. 
118. Arbitration. On its website, 800-Contacts posts a notice of its purported
requirement that its customers must submit to binding arbitration any claim that any
of them might have in connection with the customer’s purchase of any product from
800-Contacts. During the four-year period that preceded the filing of this complaint,
800-Contacts did not require its customers to indicate their assent to this purported
arbitration clause or to its other posted terms of sale. There was therefore never any
meeting of the minds between 800-Contacts and its customers that any dispute
between them must be arbitrated. 
119. 800-Contacts’ purported arbitration clause that appears on its website is
unenforceable under federal law because none of its customers was required to take
any action to express his or her assent to it. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.,
763 F.3d 1171, 1175-1176 (9th Cir.2014); Knutson v. SiriusXM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d
559, 565 (9th Cir.2014); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 38 (2d
Cir.2002).
120. Regardless, 800-Contacts failed to disclose its arbitration clause in a
reasonable manner to its customers, each of whom can therefore be said to be
“surprised” by its existence. In addition, each customer stood in a greatly inferior
bargaining position in relation to 800-Contacts. Lastly, the substantive provisions of
the arbitration clause are inequitable and oppressive: they are intended to deprive
common victims of the same wrongful business practices from obtaining appropriate
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redress by means of class-action relief, which in many instances, including the
present one, is the only practicable, viable manner in which any of them can obtain
any redress at all for such practices, since the cost, delay and difficulty of privately
arbitrating each customer’s separate claim would be prohibitive. For these reasons,
800-Contacts’ notice of a purported arbitration clause is unconscionable and should
be declared contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.
 VI. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
  (Unlawful Restraints of Trade)
  (15 U.S.C. §1)
121. Plaintiff re-pleads and incorporates by reference each of the preceding
allegations.
122. By orchestrating and enforcing the above-pled agreements with its rivals
to suppress and manipulate bidding for online advertisements, 800-Contacts has
restrained trade and interstate commerce in the United States. Its agreements with its
rivals to allocate and restrict bidding are intended to restrain trade in an
anticompetitive manner and foreseeably have had this effect.
123. As implemented and enforced by 800-Contacts, the above-pled
agreements on bidding between 800-Contacts and fourteen of its direct competitors
constitute restraints of trade that are unlawful per se under Section 1.
124. By orchestrating and enforcing the above-pled agreements with its rivals
to allocate sales and suppress online advertising, 800-Contacts has restrained trade
and interstate commerce in the United States. Its agreements with its rivals to allocate
sales and restrict online advertising are intended to restrain trade in an
anticompetitive manner and foreseeably have had this effect.
125. As implemented and enforced by 800-Contacts, 800-Contacts’
agreements with fourteen of its direct competitors on sales-allocation and the
suppression of advertising constitute restraints of trade that are unlawful per se under
Section 1.
//
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126. 800-Contacts’ above-pled restraints of trade each constitute a per se
violation of Section 1. Harm to competition is therefore presumed without any need
to define the relevant markets in which these trade restraints were imposed, nor is
there any need to show how these trade restraints have harmed competitive processes
in any of the relevant markets. 
127. Regardless, 800-Contacts’ restraints of trade have demonstrably and
significantly undermined competitive processes in three properly defined markets –
the market for the sale of contact lenses in the United States; the submarket for the
online sale of contact lenses in the United States; and the market for search-engine
advertising in the United States. In each of these markets, 800-Contacts’ restraints of
trade have purposefully and foreseeably undermined ordinary competitive interplay,
as is pled fully above. In the contact lens markets, 800-Contacts has used these
restraints to exclude and impair the operations of its rivals so that it can subject its
increasingly captive customers to higher prices and less accommodating service than
it could offer in competitive markets, and it has also restricted output by suppressing
advertising and the dissemination of information about contact lenses and by
preventing its rivals from offering lower prices, different products, alternative
financing terms and various services that it does not or cannot offer. In the market for
search-engine advertising, 800-Contacts has orchestrated collusive bidding and
suppressed advertising in furtherance of its market-allocation scheme. It has thus
restricted the output of advertising in this market and thereby deprived customers of
advertising and information about products and services.
128. Therefore, 800-Contacts’ restraints of trade are unlawful under both the
“quick-look” standard of review and the “Rule of Reason.”
129. Plaintiff and all of the members of the proposed class have suffered
antitrust injuries in proximate consequence of the anticompetitive purpose, effect and
character of each of 800-Contacts’ anticompetitive agreements. These losses can be
quantified.
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130. More specifically, Plaintiff and all members of the proposed class have
overpaid for contact lenses that they each purchased within the past four years from
800-Contacts. Plaintiff will demonstrate the probable amount of these overcharges at
a later stage of these proceedings. In addition, Plaintiff and each member of the
proposed class have been deprived of information about contact lenses, competition
for their business, and the offer of alternative and better prices, products, and
services.
131. 800-Contacts has employed its anticompetitive practices in interstate
commerce and in a manner that has affected interstate commerce. Its challenged
conduct is therefore subject to review under the antitrust laws of the United States.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks redress for the harm that she and each member
of the proposed class have suffered because of 800-Contacts’ violation of the antitrust
laws of the United States.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff now prays to this Court for the following orders and redress, to which
she is entitled under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26 and also under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23:
1. Certification of the proposed class.
2. Appointment of Plaintiff as the class representative and the Law Offices
of William Markham, P.C. and the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, a
Professional Corporation as class counsel or interim class counsel.
3. Costs for giving required notices to class members, and all associated
costs.
4. Compensatory damages, trebled under 15 U.S.C. § 15.
5. Pre-judgment interest, as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 15.
6. Injunctive and declaratory relief, as authorized under 15 U.S.C. § 26.
7. Costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as authorized by 15
U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26.
8. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.
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VIII. DEMAND OF JURY TRIAL
So far as the law allows, Plaintiff demands that a jury of her peers try her claim
against 800-Contacts.
DATED:  September 21, 2016 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ William Markham
                                                                                   
By: William A. Markham,
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM MARKHAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Pam Stillings.
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